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HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. 
By James ]. White and Robert S. Summers. St. Paul, Minnesota: 
West Publishing Company. 1972. Pp. xxbc, 1054. $14.25. 
I may well be an inappropriate reviewer for James J. White and 
Robert S. Summers' Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (Handbook). As the authors indicate in their preface 
(p. xiii), they chose to address themselves to two audiences-law stu-
dents and practitioners. I am neither, except in the sense that Arthur 
Corbin urged us all to remain, as he was throughout his life, a student 
of the law. 
The task that Professors White and Summers set for themselves 
in this one-volume treatise is an extraordinarily demanding one. To 
discuss in only 1,000 pages the large variety of transactions for which 
the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) is the governing law requires 
choices and syntheses that most academicians would find a nightmare. 
As the general literature illustrates, most of us who write seriously 
about the Code take delight in extended exegeses on a few well-
chosen, ill-drafted sections.1 Professors White and Summers have 
courageously pursued an altogether different course. With remark-
able success, they have provided an overview of the Code that is com-
prehensive in its coverage and critical in its analysis. The treatise 
draws upon and integrates both the case law and the secondary litera-
ture that has developed around the Code.2 It is bound to be a first-
line resource of exceptional utility. 
The basic organization of the Handbook follows the pattern of 
the Code itself; the major divisions of the Handbook mirror the vari-
ous articles of the Code. However, within these divisions the chap-
ters are, sensibly, organized around substantive issues rather than 
Code sections. From time to time, the treatise undertakes important 
excursions into related areas not covered by the text of the Code, 
such as the impact of strict liability in tort on the warranty provisions 
(pp. 295, 327-48, and 350-51) and the relevance of the Bankruptcy Act 
to secured transactions (ch. 24). The materials on documents of title 
contain an especially illuminating description of the federal statutes 
that govern bills of lading (ch. 21). The book's subject matter index 
serves as a reasonably useful backstop to the detailed table of con-
tents, although I sorely miss an index by Code sections. 
1. See, e.g., Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
77 YALE L.J. 833 (1968). 
2. For a comprehensive summary of the secondary literature, see M. EzER, UNIFORM 
CoMMERCIAL CODE BIDLIOGRAPHY (1972). 
[ 1487] 
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Inevitably, despite my admiration for the Handbook, I find my-
self from time to time in disagreement with it. My difficulties are 
of two very different sorts: On the one hand, there are specific is-
sues on which I find the coverage of the treatise insufficiently help-
ful; on the other hand, there are general issues whose omission I 
find puzzling. 
White and Summers' discussion of article 3 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code is marred, it seems to me, by the authors' failure to take 
up with clarity the fundamental problem of the definition of "holder" 
under articles I and 3. The construct of "holder" is, of course, crucial 
to an understanding, not only of due course holding, but also of pay-
ment and hence of discharge, all classically central aspects of the law 
of negotiable instruments. In the Code, this "holder" construct is 
muddled by the contradictory nature of the instructions contained 
in sections 1-201, 3-202, and 3-204. 
The difficulty of defining who is a holder can best be appreciated 
in a specific context. Consider the proper characterization of an in-
nocent purchaser for value of an instrument tainted by theft. Under 
section 1-201(20), the purchaser would qualify as a holder if he has 
bought paper that was, or has become, bearer paper, or was indorsed 
by his vendor, since he would then be "in possession of ... an instru-
ment ... issued or indorsed to him . . . or to bearer or in blank."3 
Section 3-2024 does not conflict with section 1-201(20) if the paper is 
issued in bearer form. 5 But if order paper ( or paper indorsed in 
blank) contains a forged indorsement, no matter how remote, section 
3-202 appears to deny holder status even to an innocent purchaser.6 
3. Section 1-201(20) states: 
"Holder" means a person who is in possession of a document of title or an in-
strument or an investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his 
order or to bearer or in blank. 
4. Section 3-202, entitled "Negotiation," states: 
(I) Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the trans-
feree becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by 
delivery with any necessary indorsement; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by 
delivery. 
(2) An indorsement must be ·written by or on behalf of the holder and on the 
instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof. 
(3) An indorsement is effective for negotiation only when it conveys the entire 
instrument or any unpaid residue. If it purports to be of less it operates only as a 
partial assignment. 
(4) Words of assignment, condition, waiver, gnaranty, limitation or disclaimer 
of liability and the like accompanying an indorsement do not affect its character 
as an indorsement. 
5. Bearer paper is negotiated by delivery alone, so possession satisfies both section 
1-201 and section 3-202. 
6. Section 3-202 conflicts with section 1-201(20)'s apparent protection of a person 
possessing paper (genuinely) indorsed to him or in blank, if section 3-202(1) defines ex-
clusively the process by which one becomes a holder and if section 3-202(2) determines 
that only holders can negotiate. Each of these propositions is open to doubt. The text of 
subsection I could also be construed as stating only one method of negotiation. The 
official comment's cross-citation, without qualification, to the article I definition of 
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In fact, the best argument for the conclusion that the innocent 
taker of bearer paper can always be a holder, while the innocent taker 
of order paper frequently cannot, is not the obscure language of arti-
cle 3, but the clear understanding of the law of negotiable instru-
ments. That law has assumed, since the mind of man runneth not 
to the contrary, that a forged indorsement irretrievably and irrevoca-
bly breaks the chain of title;7 such law is not reversed by mere per-
versities of drafting. 
Of course, Professors White and Summers attest to the Code's 
reaffirmation of this historical victory of the interests of ownership 
over good faith purchase. I do not quarrel with their conclusion but 
rather with their failure to appreciate how difficult it is for the average 
reader, if not for the average law student, to derive the correct result 
from the cited sections. Their treatment of the definition of "holder" 
in section 14-3 (p. 459) of the treatise not only fails to refer back to 
the theoretical underpinnings they themselves provide in section 
13-10 (pp. 414-15), but also omits mention of the very important 
analytical discussion contained in the senior author's own earlier 
writing.8 
I am particularly troubled by so conclusory a treatment of the 
holder problem because I am very unclear about the proper resolu-
tion of new dilemmas raised by some of the Code's explicitly revision-
ist sections. Under the pre-Code law of negotiable instruments, a 
drawer or maker who wished ab initio to assure himself of discharge 
upon subsequent good faith payment could do so by issuing paper 
in bearer form. But section 3-204(3) allows a holder to convert bearer 
paper into order paper and thus, unilaterally, to reintroduce into the 
payment process the risk of latent forged indorsements.9 Is the gen-
uine indorsement of the specially designated indorsee necessary to 
qualify an innocent transferee as a holder in order to permit the 
"holder" indicates that the draftsmen (or the comment writer) did not see any particu-
lar conflict. See UNIFOR."d: Co~rnERCIAL CODE § 3-202, Comment I. Further, subsection 2 
is as plausibly an instruction about the mere location of an indorsement as about the 
power of a particular transferee to negotiate. In all of this, it is, of course, assumed 
that a forged indorsement, no matter how expert, can never be an effective indorsement 
(see §§ 3-401, 3-404) except under the special circumstances of section 3-405. 
7. See w. BRITION, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 463-64 (2d ed. 1961); 
Kessler, Forged Indorsements, 47 YALE L.J. 863 (1938). 
8. White, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 MicH. L. REv. 1315 (1967). 
9. Section 3-204, headed "Special Indorsement; Blank Indorsement," provides: 
(I) A special indorsement specifies the person to whom or to whose order it 
makes the instrument payable. Any instrument specially indorsed becomes payable 
to the order of the special indorsee and may be further negotiated only by his in-
dorsement. 
(2) An indorsement in blank specifies no particular indorsee and may consist 
of a mere signature. An instrument payable to order and indorsed in blank becomes 
payable to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery alone until specially indorsed. 
(3) The holder may convert a blank indorsement into a special indorsement by 
"-Titing over the signature of the indorser in blank any contract consistent with the 
character of the indorsement. 
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drawer or maker's payment to discharge him and to avoid his liability 
for conversion? Presumably, the answer to this question _ is yes. 
Presumably, the effect of section 3-204 is to elevate rights of owner-
ship over rights of discharge, even though, from the point of view 
of the drawer or maker, the change made by the special indorsement 
is at least as material as those alterations deemed invidious under 
section 3-407 .10 Still, an enterprising court, conscious of possible 
limitations on the domain of sections 3-202 and 3-204, might reach 
a different result.11 
My concern with defining and confining the construct of who is 
a holder may reflect an academician's preoccupation with matters 
"arcane" and "tedious."12 But there are other points too at which the 
authors seem to have leapt rather too quickly, and with insufficient 
attention to detail, to conclusions of policy. One of these is their 
treatment of the celebrated case of Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National 
Park Bank13 and its relationship to article 5, particularly section 
5-ll4(2)(b). O'Meara is most often cited for the proposition that, in 
a letter of credit transaction, the sole determinant of the issuing 
bank's obligation to pay is the conformity of the tendered documents 
to the terms of the letter of credit, regardless of the conformity ( or 
lack thereof) of the underlying goods to the specifications of the cus-
tomer's contract with the beneficiary (p. 626).14 This absolute sep-
aration of documents from goods-a point on which all of the 
distinguished judges of the New York Court of Appeals were agreed 
-is restated in article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code by sec-
tions 5-10915 and 5-ll4.16 
10. Under section 3-407(1), 
[a]ny alteration is material [and hence potentially discharging under subsec-
tion (2)1 which changes the contract of any party thereto in any respect, including 
any such change in 
(a) the number or relations of the parties; or 
(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than as authorized; 
or 
(c) the writing assigned, by adding to it or by removing any part of it. 
11. For instance, a court might hold subsequent indorsees, but not the maker or 
drawer, bound by the instructions contained in the special indorsement. 
12. Cf. HANDBOOK, at 415 n.53, 498 n.13, describing the senior author's earlier work 
in "\Vhite, supra note 8. 
13. 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925). 
14. See, e.g., G. GILMORE &: c. BLACK, THE LAW OF .ADMIRALTY 105 (1957). 
15. Section 5-109, dealing with "Issuer's Obligation to Its Customer," states: 
(1) An issuer's obligation to its customer includes good faith and observance of 
any general banking usage but unless otherwise agreed does not include liability 
or responsibility 
(a) for performance of the underlying contract for sale or other transaction be-
tween the customer and the beneficiary; or 
(b) for any act or omission of any person other than itself or its own branch or 
for loss or destruction of a draft, demand or document in transit or in the 
possession of others; or 
(c) based on knowledge or lack of knowledge of any usage of any particular 
trade. 
(2) An issuer must examine documents with care so as to ascertain that on their 
face they appear to comply with the terms of the credit but unless otherwise agreed 
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But O' Meara was not a unanimous decision, and it is as instructive 
for its disagreements as for its consensus. In the context of a suit on 
behalf of the beneficiary seller, McLaughlin, for the majority, 
held that the National Park Bank was obligated to pay whether or 
not "the description of the merchandise contained in the documents 
presented is correct."17 Cardozo dissented. In his view, a letter of 
credit bank was entitled to refuse to pay a seller who had tendered 
"false" documents when the bank could establish defects in "relation 
to the description in the documents."18 How does section 5-ll4(2)(b) 
resolve this controversy? Clearly, the section allows the bank to 
pay, if it so chooses, despite the receipt of derogatory information 
from its customer; "good faith" is not likely to be a large constraint 
on freedom to pay. It is the converse conduct that is unclear. In 
the absence of an injunction, can the bank, if confident of its facts, 
refuse to pay because of misrepresentations in the tendered docu-
ments?10 A right of refusal under certain circumstances is certainly 
inferrable from section 5-114(2)(b): There may well be a breach 
assumes no liability or responsibility for the genuineness, falsification or effect of 
any document which appears on such examination to be regular on its face. 
(3) A non-bank issuer is not bound by any banking usage of which it has no 
knowledge. 
16. Section 5-114, titled "Issuer's Duty and Privilege to Honor; Right to Reimburse-
ment," states: 
(1) An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with 
the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents con-
form to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer 
and the beneficiary. The issuer is not excused from honor of such a draft or demand 
by reason of an additional general term that all documents must be satisfactory to 
the issuer, but an issuer may require that specified documents must be satisfactory 
to it. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to comply 
with the terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform to the 
warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section 7-507) 
or of a security (Section 8-306) or is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the 
transaction 
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is de-
manded by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand which 
has taken the draft or demand under the credit and under circumstances 
which would make it a holder in due course (Section 3-302) and in an ap-
propriate case would make it a person to whom a document of title has 
been duly negotiated (Section 7-502) or a bona fide purchaser of a security 
(Section 8-202); and 
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith may 
honor the draft or demand for payment despite notification from the cus-
tomer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the 
documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed an issuer which has duly honored a draft or de-
mand for payment is entitled to immediate reimbursement of any payment made 
under the credit and to be put in effectively available funds not later than the day 
before maturity of any acceptance made under the credit. 
[Subsections 4 and 5 are omitted here since they are optional.] 
17. 239 N.Y. at 397, 146 N.E. at 639. 
18. 239 N.Y. at 402, 146 N.E. at 641. 
19. I am indebted to Friedrich Kessler, Sterling Professor Emeritus at the Yale Law 
School, for having brought this ambiguity to my attention. 
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of warranty under section 7-507(b),20 or the document may be 
"fraudulent." A refusal to pay that is premised upon nonconformity 
with the terms of the credit is, as section 5-114(1) requires, inde-
pendent of conformity to the underlying contract of sale. Yet the 
latter observation begs the question of what kinds of discrepancies 
constitute noncompliance "with the terms of the relevant credit."21 
And a provision that an issuer "may honor" is not the equivalent 
of a provision that an issuer "need not" honor. Given the promi-
nence of the O' Meara case in the literature of letters of credit, 
the draftman's indirection should perhaps be read to leave New 
York law intact rather than reversed.22 
It is characteristic of the drafting style of article 5 that its provi-
sions (much like those of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Com-
mercial Documentary Credits) tend to emphasize what a bank may 
do rather than what it must do. Professors White and Summers rec-
ognize other instances of this drafting stance in their own discussion 
of wrongful dishonor in section 18-6 (pp. 620-23). Still, I would have 
welcomed an explicit examination of what it means to have a statute 
that is more precise about the immunities it confers than about the 
obligations it imposes. The broadly stated and repeated invitations 
to private variation that White and Summers discuss (pp. 609-15) do 
not, to my mind, make a statute's points of departure trivial or ir-
relevant. The issues of policy buried in the language and style of 
section 5-114 in particular, and article 5 in general, would have bene-
fitted from further elaboration. 
20. Under section 7-507, on "Warranties on Negotiation or Transfer of Receipt or 
Bill," 
Where a person negotiates or transfers a document of title for value otherwise 
than as a mere intermediary under the next following section, then unless other-
wise agreed he warrants to his immediate purchaser only in addition to any war-
ranty made in selling the goods 
(a) that the document is genuine; and 
(b) that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair its validity or 
worth; and 
(c) that his negotiation or transfer is rightful and fully effective with respect to 
the title to the document and the goods it represents. 
21. There is evidence that customers continue to request, and banks to issue, letters 
of credit that require documents containing detailed information against which de-
mands for payment must be measured. See, e.g., Banco Espanol de Credito v. State 
Street Bank &: Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968) 
(discussed in HANDBOOK, at 621, 625 n.108). 
22. Such a reading would take the instructions contained in section 5-114(2)(b) to 
contain only two alternatives: Ordinarily the bank must pay, and will be deemed in 
good faith if it pays, despite suspicions of latent defects in the documents, but the cus-
tomer may get an injunction to preclude payment on any of the grounds substantively 
stated. The statute would thus be merely an extension of the procedure developed in 
Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941). 
That case assumed fraud in the factum; section 5-114(2)(b) allows judicial intervention 
on a broader set of allegations, such as forgery and ordinary fraud. 
It is perhaps worth noting that Comment 2 to section 5-114 suggests a broader read-
ing and adoption of the Cardozo position. 
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My difficulties with Professors White and Summers' treatment of 
particular problems under articles 3 and 5 reflect, I suppose, natural 
differences of opinion about what is worthy of emphasis and what 
can be briefly summarized. I am more puzzled by the authors' fail-
ure to treat at all certain issues of both historical and contemporary 
interest. 
One of the precursors of article 9's detailed regulation of security 
arrangements is the protection afforded at common law to claims of 
ownership in chattels against the competing interests of good faith 
purchasers and levying creditors. The common law dealt with these 
irreconcilable claims through a variety of doctrines, such as fraudu-
lent conveyance, ostensible ownership, cash sale, voidable title, and 
entrusting.23 Article 2, as did the Uniform Sales Act24 before it, re-
states these principles and, inevitably, reshapes their contours. For 
example, while prior statutes and case law emphasized the fraudulent 
aspects of any seller's retention of possession of sold goods, section 
2-403(2),25 in assessing the validity of a subsequent sale, looks in-
stead to the seller's status and to the circumstances of the subsequent 
buyer's purchase. Under this section, only a merchant seller26 has 
power, after a prior sale, to pass good title, and then only to a buyer 
in the ordinary course of business.27 Ordinary purchasers in good 
23. See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE LJ. 
1057 (1954). 
24. UNIFORM SALES Ac:r §§ 23-26. 
25. Section 2-403(2) states: 
Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that 
kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary 
course of business. 
Entrusting is defined in section 2-403(3): 
"Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of posses-
sion regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or 
acquiescence and regardless whether the procurement of the entrusting or the 
possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the 
criminal law. 
26. Section 2-104(1) defines merchant: 
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his 
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices 
or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be 
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by 
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill. 
The application of section 2-403(2) is limited to the class of merchants who deal in 
goods of the kind, excluding those otherwise holding themselves out as having special 
knowledge or skill. 
27. Section 1-201(9) defines "buyer in the ordinary course of business" as 
a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in viola-
tion of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys 
in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind but 
does not include a pawnbroker .••• "Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of 
other property or on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or 
documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does not include a 
transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt. 
The 1972 amendment to the Code added an intermediary sentence, after "pawn-
broker": "All persons who sell minerals or the like (including oil and gas) at wellhead 
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faith from ordinary sellers are left to speculative arguments under 
section 2-403(1)28 involving either a distortion of "voidable title" 
or an even less likely extension of "fraud punishable as larcenous." 
In contrast to section 2-403, however, section 2-40229 protects any 
creditor who deals with any seller left in possession if the retention 
is fraudulent against him under state law, regardless of the seller's 
professional status or of the creditor's actual knowledge of the prior 
sale.30 This latter aspect of the creditor's avoidance powers, because 
it differs from his upset powers under section 9-301(1)(b),31 creates 
interesting opportunities for jockeying between articles 2 and 9. 
I find these article 2 provisions about third-party rights and their 
interrelationship with article 9 both interesting and confusing. Per-
haps they represent a draftsman dealing, on the one hand, with back-
or minehead shall be deemed to be persons in the business of selling goods of that 
kind." 
28. Section 2-403(1) provides: 
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power 
to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the 
extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer 
a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered 
under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though 
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or 
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or 
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale," or 
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the 
criminal law. 
Section 2-403 concludes with: 
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed 
by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and 
Documents of Title (Article 7). 
29. Section 2-402, entitled "Rights of Seller's Creditors against Sold Goods," states: 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), rights of unsecured creditors 
of the seller with respect to goods which have been identified to a contract for 
sale are subject to the buyer's rights to recover the goods under this Article (Sec• 
tions 2-502 and 2-716). 
(2) A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods to a 
contract for sale as void if as against him a retention of possession by the seller is 
fraudulent under any rule of law of the state where the goods are situated, except 
that retention of possession in good faith and current course of trade by a mer-
chant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale or identification is not 
fraudulent. 
(3) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights of creditors of 
the seller 
(a) under the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9); or 
(b) where identification to the contract or delivery is made not in current 
course of trade but in satisfaction of or as security for a pre-existing claim 
for money, security or the like and is made under circumstances which under 
any rule of law of the state where the goods are situated would apart from 
this Article constitute the transaction a fraudulent transfer or voidable 
preference. 
30. There is a minor exception for buyers who leave goods with a merchant seller 
for a commercially reasonable (presumably brief) period of time. 
31. Under the 1962 Official Text, section 9-30l(l)(b), defining those who could take 
priority over unperfected security interests, included "a person who becomes a lien 
creditor without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected." 
The 1972 amended version of article 9 deletes the knowledge requirement, bringing 
article 9 into line with the section 2-402(2) formulation. The new section provides upset 
powers for. "a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is 
perfected." 
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stops and, on the other, with serious commercial problems; perhaps 
they reflect a change in attitude brought about as the Code's horizons 
expanded and its drafting style became more technical. In any case, 
I was disappointed that I could discover no mention in the Hand-
book of any of these problems, save for the brief comparison of sec-
tions 2-403 and 9-307 (pp. 944-46) and the elliptical observation that 
"[i]n certain respects, 2-403 is more generous to subsequent pur-
chasers than is 9-307" (p. 945). 
It may well be that the article 2 provisions on third-party claims 
do not loom large in the litigation under the Code. Yet they are illus-
trative of a larger question that the authors have been reluctant to 
explore. Sections 2-402 and 2-403 draw explicitly, as many sections of 
the Code draw implicitly,32 upon pre-existing common law. What is 
the role of a statute like the Code in a common law jurisprudence? 
In the absence of express incorporation or contradiction, to what 
extent should courts view the Code as a source of common law?33 
Earlier American statutes codifying parts of what we call commer-
cial law were often swallowed whole by the common law. Just as 
Judge Mansfield subjugated English mercantile law by incorporating 
it into general common law, so the Uniform Sales Act well-nigh dis-
appeared from view into the common law, despite its broad enact-
ment.34 As John Honnold has noted, "Our courts have a loose way 
with statutes when they feel they understand the problem."35 A less 
kind commentator might have added, "whether or not they in fact 
understand." 
Karl Llewellyn, the chief draftsman of the Code, was acutely 
conscious of, and essentially sympathetic toward, the "Common Law 
Tradition," as he entitled his last book. Grant Gilmore, a collabora-
tor of long standing in the drafting of the Code, described Llewel-
lyn's view: "He had clearly in mind the idea of a case-law Code, 
one that would furnish guidelines for a fresh start, would accom-
modate itself to changing circumstances, would not so much contain 
the law as free it for a new growth."36 Llewellyn's approach is 
sometimes traceable into the wording of certain operative sections, 
32. In article 2, see, for example, the common law concepts of title (section 2-401), 
substantial impairment of value (sections 2-608 and 2-612), and proximate damages 
(sections 2-714 and 2-715). 
33. See generally Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CA.TH. U. L. 
REV. 401 (1968), reprinted in 43 CAL. ST. BAR J. 509 (1968). 
34. See Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. CoLO. L. REv. 461, 466-67 (1967). 
35. Honnold, American Experience under the Sales Article of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, in AsPECTS OF COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL !..Aw: SALES, CoNSUMER CREDIT 
AND SECURED TRANSAcrIONS 3, 10 a. Ziegel&: W. Foster ed. 1969) [hereinafter AsPECTS OF 
COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW]. 
For a particularly striking example of "looseness" with article 2's remedial sections, 
see the interpretation of sections 2-714 and 2-715 in Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v. 
Irwin, 411 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d 376 (1963). 
36. Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962). 
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for example, section 2-30237 and sections 9-102 and 9-202.38 But it 
is principally memorialized by the general prescriptions in article I, 
which are designed to assure, as much as any statute can, capacities 
for flexibility and adaptation and growth.89 Professors White and 
Summers pass over these sections (pp. 14-16 and 19-20),40 as over the 
pre-Code case law (p. xiv), without sufficient attention to their 
implication for cases as yet undecided, problems as yet unlitigated, 
and issues as yet unappreciated. As Grant Gilmore has said: 
We know enough about the experience of living with statutes or 
under Codes to know that the early opponents of codification were 
wrong in £earing that the result of codification would be to freeze 
the law as of the date of the Code's enactment. The law, codified, 
goes its merry way-much to the disgust of conservative practitioners 
-and at much the same pace as the law, uncodified.41 
A treatise about the Uniform Commercial Code should take seriously 
every article that the Code contains. 
In the final analysis, however, it bears repeating that no two au-
thors, not to speak of three, 42 can be expected to take the same view 
of the field of commercial law or of the role of the Code in that law.43 
Professors White and Summers' emphasis on the emerging case law 
under the Code, and their critical analysis of that case law, provide 
a sound and functional approach to a fascinating and complex field. 
The success of their treatise is as assured as it is well-deserved. 
Ellen A. Peters, 
Professor of Law, 
Yale Law School 
37. The approach of section 2-302 is described and criticized in Leff, Unconscion-
ability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967), and in 
subsequent articles describing and criticizing Professor Leif's approach (cited in the 
HANDBOOK, at 115 n.12). 
38. These sections define the broad sweep of article 9 to be operative, under section 
9-102(l)(a), for "any transaction (regardless of its form)," and, under section 9-202, 
"whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor." 
39. See K.ripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 1962 U. JI.I.. L.F. 321, 328-32. 
40. There is not even a reference to Professor Summers' own excellent article, Sum-
mers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968). 
41. Gilmore, Commercial Law in the United States: Its Codification and Other Mis-
adventures, in AsPEcrs OF COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 35, at 449, 461. 
42. From time to time, the authors surface their own disagreement about particular 
problems in ways I found more amusing than their choice of nomenclature for hypo-
thetical characters. 
43. See Donnelly, Book Review, 25 J. l.EGAL En. 94 (1973). 
